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Abstract:  In the introductory article for this special issue, we argue that studying territorial 
politics through comparative-historical analysis (CHA) offers valuable insights for 
understanding the changing territorial distribution of authority in federal, regional, and 
decentralized countries. We point to limitations that have beset the analysis of territorial 
politics and suggest how recent advances in CHA offer a promising approach to avoid and 
overcome existing shortcomings. We also demonstrate and illustrate the ways that vertical 
and horizontal dimensions of territorial structures evolve over time, from the moment they 
are created to subsequent episodes of reform. Our aim is to show that time has causal 
relevance in connecting past and present patterns of change and continuity, and thus in 








 The Scottish Independence Referendum and the Brexit Referendum are just two 
events that brought the relevance of territorial authority back into the limelight. Both events 
are indicative of the contemporary resurgence of territory in domestic politics, a process that 
is affecting a broad range of states across the globe, federal and unitary alike. As the 
continuous debates about the relation between center and periphery in the UK illustrate, these 
issues are not just settled once and for all, in a single political event. Rather, they are a 
permanent aspect of political life in which the territorial structures of the state are 
continuously contested and re-negotiated by political actors (Gagnon and Tully 2001; 
Keating 2013). This observation is also valid for other decentralized, regional and federal 
systems in Africa, Europe, Latin America, North America and South Asia. 
Research on the territorial dimension of authority has been the domain of comparative 
federalism. Scholars in this field devoted their attention to the establishment of federations 
during the process of state-formation (Ziblatt 2006), the distribution of power between 
federal and state governments (Falleti 2010), the stability or instability of federal systems 
(Lemco 1991) and processes of constitutional change (Behnke and Benz 2009; Petersohn, 
Behnke, and Rhode 2015). These concerns have been complemented by a growing literature 
on the sources of regionalization to form a larger body of work in comparative politics 
(Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2016; Jeffery and Wincott 2010). 
We can therefore observe the emergence of an increasingly diversified landscape 
within comparative politics that shares an interest in territorial politics, a notion that refers to 
the relationship between geographical centers and peripheries and to the horizontal and 
vertical interaction of spatially bounded sites of political authority - i.e. central and regional 
governments - and the contestation between them over the degree of a state’s economic, 
political and cultural integration. Territorial politics is concerned with such issues as the 
establishment and (re)organization of politico-administrative boundaries, the incorporation of 
 distinct territories into a political system, the relative autonomy and capacity of sub-national 
territorial entities and the articulation of their interests at the center. The central premise of 
this special issue is that studying territorial politics with comparative-historical analysis 
(CHA) -- a case-based macroscopic analysis that is sensitive to context and temporality 
(Thelen and Mahoney 2015) -- holds valuable insights for understanding such substantively 
interesting outcomes as the changing territorial distribution of authority across countries. 
The articles in this issue aim to develop such insights by examining how and why the 
territorial distribution of authority evolves over time across different countries. In doing so, 
each article seeks to address questions that are fundamental to understanding processes of 
authority migration: How do territorial structures adjust to economic and cultural diversity 
and to changing ideas about the political community that draw upon separate episodes of a 
country’s history? How do the circumstances present and the decisions taken during the 
origins of a country’s territorial structures influence the trajectory that these subsequently 
adopt? How do different political actors help to reform or to maintain a country’s structures 
at different moments in time? And how does the accumulation of different reforms bring 
about the gradual transformation of a country’s territorial structures? 
To answer these questions, we elaborate in this introductory article an analytical 
framework for studying territorial politics with CHA. We start our endeavor by pointing to 
three limitations that have beset the analysis of territorial politics and suggest how recent 
advances in CHA offer a promising approach to avoid and overcome existing shortcomings. 
Then, we make a case for the importance of the temporal dimension in analyzing change and 
persistence of institutional vertical and horizontal distributions of authority over time. The 
third section specifies the influence of the sources and mechanisms that generate different 
patterns of territorial dynamics. We conclude with an overview of how the articles in this 
issue apply this framework. 
 TERRITORIAL POLITICS AND THE PITFALL OF DICHOTOMIES 
 
The notion of territorial politics is an important conceptual linchpin in comparative politics. 
At the same time, however, this notion is fraught with an ambiguity that is rooted in the use 
of three dichotomies that have frequently informed research in comparative federalism, 
which, we argue, have also obscured important features of the topic. 
The unitary-federal dichotomy is grounded in the leitmotif of a territorially integrated 
nation-state as the focal point of political authority. Through the lens of this dichotomy, the 
formation and development of the modern state appears as a process driven by an inherently 
centralizing dynamic that ushered in the unitary state. Only in those cases of state-building 
where it was difficult to overcome center-periphery cleavages did territoriality continue to be 
an important issue in domestic politics, sometimes leading to a federal state. Yet the limits of 
this neat distinction become obvious in light of cases of ongoing decentralization reforms 
which have not resulted in the introduction of a federation per se. Instead, we observe the 
existence of hybrid forms of the state (Baldi 1999) such as the United Kingdom or Italy that 
barely qualify as unitary states, but also lack the constitutional characteristics of a classic 
federation. In response, the literature has introduced more fine-grained types such as a 
unitary-decentralized state, a regionalized state, or a union state (Mitchell 2009; Swenden 
2006). However, these efforts have also been criticized for being unsystematic, as categories 
are often derived inductively from individual cases. Using a deductive approach, Barrios-
Suvelza (2014) has offered a promising and more clear-cut taxonomy for systematic 
comparison rooted in the distinction between “simple” and “composite” states.1  
The direction of authority migration (Gerber and Kollman 2004) within simple and 
composite states has been measured with the centralization-decentralization dichotomy. 
Classical scholarship emphasized an ongoing trend towards centralization within the modern 
 federal state (Riker 1964), while the decades following the 1970s are considered an era of 
steady regionalization (Keating 2008; Marks, Hooghe, and Schakel 2008). These claims 
obscure the fact that authority migration is by no means unidirectional, as we frequently 
observe simultaneous processes of decentralization and centralization. For instance, during 
recent reforms in Switzerland and Germany, jurisdictions were dis-entangled and re-assigned 
between the federal and regional level, strengthening the autonomy of both tiers (Benz 2016; 
Broschek 2015a). Likewise, the decentralization of power to regional governments in Europe 
was paralleled by the transfer of power to the supranational level during successive reforms 
to the European Treaties (Fossum and Menéndez 2011). Moreover, this dichotomy overlooks 
an important element underlying decentralization: the horizontal reconfiguration of power 
among constituent units on a symmetric or asymmetric basis, a feature that can be highly 
politicized in multinational states like Belgium, Spain, Canada or India (Requejo 1999). In 
short, this dichotomy needs to be situated within a more encompassing analytical frame to 
appreciate the simultaneous and multi-directional nature of authority migration. 
Finally, the continuity-change dichotomy refers to the way in which we interpret 
political developments through a lens that highlights either continuity or change. Historically-
minded political scientists are often accused of overemphasizing continuity. This holds for 
classical work in CHA as well as works that rely on ‘path dependent’ explanations; both tend 
to cut historical processes into neatly ordered slices of continuity interrupted by infrequent 
bursts of dramatic change (Orren and Skowronek 2004). Scholars that deploy a-historical 
theoretical approaches, as in the rational choice tradition, can often be blamed for the 
opposite: they ignore historically-constructed institutional and ideational constraints that 
shape the preferences and choice-set of actors, overestimating the possibility of change. To 
avoid the shortcomings associated with these simplifying assumptions, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that any historical episode always contains elements of continuity and change 
 (Benz and Broschek 2013). Indeed, both elements interact at any given point in time. 
Deliberate reform is frequently absent, with change occurring only at the margins, and in 
implicit ways. At other times, unitary and federal systems undergo far-reaching reforms, as 
was the case Italy in 2001, Belgium in 1992-93, Australia in 2007-2008 or Germany in 2004-
2006. Change, then, becomes predominant. But, it nevertheless unfolds within an institutional 
architecture whose main pillars, like the jurisdictional boundaries of regional governments, 
remain in place. Even during critical junctures, when transformative change is more likely to 
occur, pre-existing conditions shape outcomes. For instance, federalism reoccurred in 
Germany during the turning points of 1918-19 and 1945-49, despite a strong preference for a 
unitary state among both political elites and masses and despite the different constitutional 
arrangements offered by the presidential system of the Weimar Republic and the 
parliamentary system of the Federal Republic (Lehmbruch 2002; Thelen and Karcher 2013). 
In order to more fully exploit their potential as analytical metrics for the study of 
territorial politics, we posit that it is useful to situate the three dichotomies sketched above 
within a more encompassing approach that adopts a comparative and historical perspective. 
 
THE PROMISE OF COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Understanding the temporality of territorial politics is an objective that resonates with the 
foundations of CHA (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Thelen and Mahoney 2015). Recent 
work in this tradition has adopted a macro-historical scope and an inductive, case-based 
approach to explore variations in substantively important outcomes, such as democratization, 
welfare provision and the transformation of state authority more generally. We suggest that 
CHA can help to advance comparative research on territorial politics in a number of ways. 
 First, it encourages scholars to employ case-based comparisons to tackle ‘real world’ 
empirical puzzles (Thelen and Mahoney 2015). For example, as minority groups and stateless 
nations have claimed territorial autonomy or independence in an increasing number of 
countries, federalism has been lauded as the only viable institutional option to accommodate 
territorial diversity (Gagnon and Tully 2001). Yet, as Hooghe and Marks (2016) indicate, 
these claims have not usually led to the creation of a federation: the rise of regional authority 
has not produced a federal revolution. In Western Europe, the UK and Spain have 
transformed into a devolved union and regionalized state, respectively; the only case of 
federalization is Belgium, but even here demands for further institutional change remain 
salient issues on the agenda. Michael Breen’s contribution to this issue deals with such a 
puzzle: among the multinational states of South Asia experiencing secessionist threats, why 
do some adopt federal institutions, while others do not? Using three case studies, Breen 
builds on Daniel Ziblatt’s (2006) work on the origins of federalism in nineteenth century 
Germany and Italy, to show that the prevalence of a secession risk combined with peripheral 
infrastructural capacities are crucial for explaining when we can expect the transformation of 
a unitary state to a ‘holding-together’ federation.  
Second, when addressing these kinds of puzzles, scholars in the CHA tradition ground 
their analysis in what Arthur Stinchcombe (1968) has called the ‘logic of historical 
causation.’ That means that they specify the conditions that are responsible for the 
emergence, persistence and unravelling of a substantive outcome of interest, such as changes 
in the territorial organization of a state. Being rather skeptical of variable-centered, 
correlational analysis, CHA engages in what Mayntz (2004) has called “causal 
reconstruction.” This requires identifying the recurrent processes that generate political 
institutions or institutional dynamics, in other words, the mechanisms that connect context, 
initial conditions and specific outcomes (Falleti and Lynch 2009). Despite its focus on large-
 scale macroscopic developments, CHA is not confined to one level of analysis; mechanisms 
may in fact operate on the micro-, meso- and macro-level (Beach and Pedersen 2012; Falleti 
and Lynch 2009). For example, Gibson’s (2013) mechanism of ‘boundary control’ explains 
how federalism enabled regional authoritarian leaders to fend off democratization efforts 
from the center, whereby their success is related to their ability to establish hegemonic power 
within constituent units and pre-empt the political space prior to democratization at the 
national level. While this power-based mechanism at first glance has a micro-foundation (the 
interests of regional authoritarian political leaders), its activation is contingent upon 
preceding developments during which subnational authoritarian enclaves became 
institutionalized. This historical preemption of political space which provides authoritarian 
subnational governments with power resources to exercise boundary control can only be 
made visible through causal reconstruction (see also Pierson 2015). 
Third, scholars adopting CHA have taken seriously the importance of temporality 
(Falleti and Mahoney 2015; Grzymala-Busse 2011). They have shown that the temporal 
structure of processes - such as timing, sequencing and cumulation - can bear a direct effect 
on ultimate outcomes. The significance of Falleti’s (2010) landmark study on decentralization 
in Latin America is to show that the sequencing of different types of administrative, fiscal 
and political decentralization in an overall process of reform determines the resulting 
territorial distribution of power. Over time, even the accumulation of failed territorial reforms 
can be an important catalyst for change, as Jennifer Todd (2014), in a similar vein, shows in 
her study of Northern Ireland, where successive initiatives by the British and Irish 
governments brought ethno-religious conflict closer to the ‘threshold’ of resolution. The 
temporal location of events is relevant for understanding outcomes, since episodes of change 
affect one another over time and this influence forms an important part of the context in 
which actors operate. The main idea running through this tradition is that events early in a 
 process exert a strong causal effect. For instance, Broschek (2012), explains the divergent 
trajectories of Canada and Germany with reference to the solutions selected during the 
formative period of state-building. He shows that the cooperative model and unitary 
conception of sovereignty in Germany were reproduced over time by the power of political 
parties and bureaucrats that adhered to these rules and ideas. In Canada, in contrast, a 
consensus on the ‘moral foundations’ of federalism was lacking and together with the dual 
model of federalism created the space for contestation. This finding echoes Pierson’s (2004, 
163) insight that “original designers may be less capable of sustaining control over long-term 
paths of institutional development” whenever “demarcations of authority are ambiguous.” 
In sum, CHA offers a promising avenue for studying territorial politics by 
encouraging researchers to focus on real-world empirical puzzles, in which institutional 
outcomes are produced by a configuration of actor-based causal conditions that are situated in 
historical and temporal contexts. In this respect, CHA can be distinguished from several 
competing approaches. Leading works in the rational choice tradition have developed formal 
propositions about the kind of institutions -- such as party organizations or courts -- that 
engender federal stability (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004) or a robust federation 
(Bednar 2009); but studies in this tradition are not always characterized by rigorous empirical 
verification. On the other hand, empirical studies that adopt a quantitative methodology to 
examine the sources of regional authority run the risk of being ahistorical and reductionist in 
their focus on the effect of a single structural factor across time and space, such as income 
(Sambanis and Milanovic 2014) or ethno-linguistic fragmentation (Erk and Koning 2010). 
The appreciation of political agency in bringing about change through contestation and 
negotiation in a specific context has been brought to the fore (Behnke and Benz 2009). But 
given their intensive micro-level engagement, such analyses tend to take a ‘snapshot’ of 
individual episodes of reform, usually in single case-studies (Braun 2009; Colino 2009), 
 rather than a ‘moving picture’ of how such reforms unfold over time. Building upon the 
advances of CHA, we discuss in the next section ways to avoid the pitfalls of these 
dichotomies, drawing on the twin concepts of territorial regimes and territorial dynamics. 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS 
 
Territorial regimes: composite and multi-layered political orders 
The notion of “territorial regimes,” introduced by scholars such as Jim Bulpitt (2008) and 
Edward Gibson (2013), offers a useful heuristic to map the unit of analysis that transcends the 
unitary-federal dichotomy. Similar to Gibson (2013), we conceptualize territorial regimes as 
‘composite’ political orders (Barrios-Suvelza 2014) whose main feature is the interaction 
between spatially bounded entities that exercise legitimate authority over their territory and 
population and that rule in interaction with other constituent units and the overarching tier of 
which they are a part. Territorial regimes exhibit a “multi-layered” nature (Orren and 
Skowronek 2004). The institutional layer defines the formal authority relationships that exists 
alongside a societal and ideational layer. The societal layer captures the degree of diversity 
(economic, cultural, ethnic) that impacts on political cleavages and competition across the 
territory. The ideational layer refers to the set of normative ideas that legitimate the specific 
design and institutions of a country’s territorial structures (Broschek 2011). The outcome of 
interest that we investigate in this special issue is the change to the institutional layer over 
time. 
The institutional layer consists of the formal and informal rules that define the 
institutional architecture of territorial regimes and establish formal authority relationships 
between central and regional governments. Historically, center-periphery conflicts translated 
into different forms of ‘political structuring,’ i.e. institutional mechanisms deployed by state 
 builders to accommodate peripheral protest that resulted in the demarcation of distinct spatial 
sites of authority (Bartolini 2005). Within this architecture, territorially bounded sites of 
authority are connected vertically and horizontally through institutional relationships that 
reflect the imperatives for balancing territorial diversity with state unity. 
Vertical and horizontal relationships among central and regional governments 
produce different forms of self-rule and shared-rule (Elazar 1987). Self-rule refers to the 
institutional provisions that furnish constituent entities with the powers and resources to act 
autonomously. Shared-rule refers to the institutions that provide for interdependence and 
cooperation between constituent entities and the central government, or between constituent 
entities only.2 Although all territorial regimes combine elements of self-rule and shared-rule, 
they tend to lean towards one pole, engendering inter-institutional and intra-institutional types 
of regimes (Broschek 2015b). For example, in the United Kingdom and Canada inter-
institutional linkages are more dominant. Accordingly, both cases tilt towards self-rule, as 
both the center and the peripheries enjoy considerable autonomy to regulate their own matters 
while institutional entanglement is weak. Germany and Switzerland, in contrast, lean towards 
shared-rule, encouraging constituent entities to collaborate when making collective decisions 
due to pronounced intra-institutional linkages. These linkages remain relevant for the long-
term trajectory of a territorial regime as they furnish actors with different resources to either 
promote or hinder institutional change. 
Horizontal relationships between governments of constituent units can be categorized 
according to the degree of heterogeneity in the allocation of power. At one end of the 
spectrum, constituent units enjoy a symmetrical level of autonomy, while at the other end, 
each one has jurisdiction over a different set of competences. Introducing horizontal 
asymmetry affects the relation between units if the less-empowered regions start engaging in 
horizontal competition either by catching-up with the more-empowered regions or by 
 blocking further decentralization, invoking ideas of equal treatment or justice (Hombrado 
2011; Zuber 2011). Apart from competition, regional governments may also decide to 
cooperate. Voluntary cooperation can turn into institutionalized forms of horizontal joint 
decision-making, as in the case of ministerial conferences of German Länder. Similarly, in 
Belgium, exercising constitutionally granted autonomy has been made conditional upon the 
conclusion of cooperation agreements between regions. These examples suggest that self-rule 
is also influenced – and counterbalanced – by horizontal relationships of shared-rule. 
These dimensions provide the parameters of a map on which to place different 
country cases: all countries featuring two independent tiers of government with law-making 
authority can be included. This can range from classical federations such as Switzerland, to 
more recently established ones such as Belgium, to regionalized, devolved and unitary states 
such as Spain, the UK, or Uganda. By eschewing the federal-unitary and centralization-
decentralization dichotomies and focusing on the dimensions of the institutional layer, we are 
equipped with a concept that enables us to make meaningful comparisons between and within 
groups of countries that are otherwise not categorized together, for instance federal Belgium 
and the British Union, or federal Nepal and unitary Sri Lanka. This comparison is necessary 
for appreciating how different institutions are produced by the distinct responses of states to 
common imperatives, such as preserving territorial integrity in the face of secessionist threats. 
Moreover, how these dimensions structure formal authority relationships provides 
insights into the propensity of a territorial regime for institutional change. An essential 
feature of the institutional layer, already identified in classical works on federalism (Friedrich 
1968), is that it evolves continuously: there can be minor adjustments or far-reaching changes 
repeatedly brought to vertical and horizontal dimensions over extended periods of time. What 
is important to acknowledge is that the reasons for the change that occurs, the likelihood that 
it will occur, and the timing and ways in which it occurs are all shaped by the properties of 
 the territorial regime itself (Colino 2013). One of the insights that we thus develop below is 
that territorial regimes contain the seeds of their own transformations. 
 
Territorial dynamics: the temporality of territorial regimes 
 The concept of territorial dynamics captures the idea that time has causal relevance in 
connecting past and present patterns of change and continuity. Appreciating the causal 
relevance of time entails focusing on the different temporal aspects of a territorial regime: the 
moment surrounding the creation of a territorial regime, the developmental trajectory that it 
subsequently adopts, and the territorial reform that yields institutional change or continuity. 
Focusing on these three temporal aspects allows us to capture the formative and 
developmental pathways that federal, regional, and decentralized countries adopt and thus to 
understand their time-dependent behavior. 
Territorial regimes are first established during the moment of creation. The origins of 
a territorial regime impinge on three critical aspects of the institutional layer. First, it 
establishes the territorial boundaries of constituent units. This may be a straightforward 
matter where enduring boundaries exist, as was the case with Scotland, or where there is an 
administrative inheritance from a previous colonial regime, as was the case with British 
colonies in the USA or provinces in India. But it may also be more contested where 
constituent units need to be created from scratch, as occurred with certain Autonomous 
Communities in Spain, or if ethnic groups are geographically mixed like in Brussels, which 
has led to a complex territorial overlapping of jurisdictions between Regions and 
Communities. Boundaries are decisive elements of territorial regimes because they tend to 
“crystallize certain constellations of interest” and thus persist over time (Tillin 2015, 629). 
Second, creation shapes the formal architecture of a territorial regime by either furnishing all 
governmental tiers with genuine law-making authority, as it is the case in federations, or 
 establishing a constitutional hierarchy in which one tier remains subordinate to the other, as it 
is the case in confederal arrangements or unitary states. It is crucial whether during state 
formation, center-periphery conflicts are accommodated within a regionalized but unitary 
state or within the framework of a federal state. As Pierson (2015) has aptly put it, “power 
begets power.” Accordingly, the initial victory of those actors in favor of a unitary state often 
creates a self-reinforcing dynamic which makes it difficult for federalism advocates to 
challenge the status quo at a later point in time. We can observe these long-term 
consequences of early constitutional settlements in contemporary Western Europe as 
federalization processes within unitary states like Italy or Spain have stalled. Third, creation 
witnesses the establishment of decision-rules that regulate how peripheries are connected to 
the center. By defining the process and thresholds for institutional reforms that transfer power 
and resources, these rules have an important bearing on the propensity of a territorial regime 
towards change or towards continuity. 
Following their creation, territorial regimes embark on a developmental trajectory in 
which their institutions evolve over time. Constituent units become empowered as they 
develop their authority, acquire their own resources and become engaged in vertical and 
horizontal cooperation agreements, a process historically-minded Canadian political scientists 
have coined “province-building” (Black and Cairns 1966). With regional elections, they are 
bestowed with their own legitimacy and project a distinct political identity. Crucially, this 
enables them to develop their own constitutional demands and to become drivers of change or 
guardians of continuity within the territorial regime. This will pertain not simply to the 
discrete re-calibration of vertical or horizontal relationships, but to the very purpose of 
federal arrangements. For instance, in Spain the substance of territorial politics gradually 
evolved from language to money: from the regulation of ethnic conflict through ethno-
 federalism, linguistic pluralism and asymmetric autonomy, to the rationalization of decision-
making and the enhancement of the fiscal accountability of regional governments. 
Adjustments to the institutional layer are brought about during discrete episodes of 
territorial reform, such as the reform of German federalism in 2004-06, the Neue 
Finanzausgleich (NFA) in Switzerland in 1995-2004 or the reform to Statutes of Autonomy 
in Spain (2004-08). These are deliberate efforts to change the status quo that require the 
explicit alteration of a given allocation of authority; the failure of such efforts results in 
continuity. The contributions in this special issue, most notably the case studies by Benz and 
Sonnicksen as well as by Basta, demonstrate that territorial reforms are not isolated events. 
CHA brings to the fore how reform episodes are always situated within a broader set of 
reforms that aim to achieve a goal. The reason for this is that it may take several efforts for a 
government to enact its agenda of reform, either because reforms tackling different 
dimensions of the institutional layer may require different types of legal instruments,3 or 
because reform initiatives are blocked or diluted and thus require new initiatives. Even in 
case of successful ratification, reform opponents may be able to undermine reform goals in 
the long term (Patashnik 2008). In such an eventuality, it is likely that the substance of 
successive territorial reforms will be shaped by the incomplete or partial enactment of earlier 
ones, thus creating strong temporal inter-dependencies between reform initiatives. Therefore, 
to understand the different trajectories adopted by federal regimes, it is necessary to examine 
the set of territorial reforms that are inspired by similar or different objectives and to study 
how discrete territorial reforms are inter-dependent of one another and build upon each other 
in a cumulative fashion over time. 
Reform can be contrasted with adaptation, a more passive and implicit mode of 
institutional change (Behnke and Benz 2009; Benz and Colino 2011) that occurs when 
territorial regimes adjust to new political and environmental circumstances. Adaptation can 
 happen, for instance, if a Court re-interprets constitutional provisions without explicitly 
changing their wording. Benz and Sonnicksen’s contribution shows that the German Federal 
Constitutional Court facilitated agreement on the Föderalismusreform I because it 
reinterpreted the legal rationale for federal preemption of concurrent legislation in 2005, at a 
point when negotiations between the federal government and the Länder were stalled. 
Adaptation can also occur when the allocation of competences is ambiguous. This is often the 
case in newly emerging policy areas that are not clearly allocated to either level, as is 
currently the case with the ratification of new “deep” trade agreements like the Canada-
European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) that affect sub-
national competences and have thus encouraged regional governments to assert a role in trade 
politics.4 Finally, adaptation can arise as “institutional drift” (Hacker 2005) if one policy area 
becomes more important and strengthens a governmental tier. We can witness drift with the 
case of social policy in Canadian federalism where the responsibility over social policy was 
assigned to the provinces because it was considered to be of local and minor importance at 
the time of Confederation. In the wake of industrialization and the Great Depression, the 
context shifted dramatically: social policy emerged as an important state function and 
valuable resource for generating loyalty in a divided society. In this new context, jurisdiction 
over social policy became a tool for province-building and sub-federal policy innovation. The 
federal level, in turn, asserted its own role in this field, developing the highly contested 
federal spending power doctrine. The power relation and territorial conflicts between center 
and periphery therefore changed over time often without active change to the territorial 




 SOURCES AND MECHANISMS OF TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS 
 
Identifying the configurations of contextual and causal factors that produce institutional 
change or continuity lies at the heart of CHA-inspired research. To do so, we follow the 
distinction that Gerber and Kollman (2004) established between the sources of change, which 
constitute the “distant” contextual factors that stimulate a pressure or demand for change, and 
the mechanisms of change, which constitute the “proximate” factors that translate these 
demands into a distinct pattern of territorial dynamics. 
 
Sources of territorial dynamics 
Territorial dynamics draw their sources from factors that are exogenous or endogenous to a 
territorial regime. Exogenous factors typically refer to important external ‘shocks’ that 
fundamentally transform the political environment, such as a war, an economic crisis, a 
‘wave’ of democratization, or a shift in hegemonic ideas. These shocks are conceptualized as 
‘critical junctures’ – relatively short periods of time during which otherwise strong structural 
constraints are relaxed, allowing for the deliberate decisions of political actors (and possible 
contingent events) to have a long-lasting influence (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). 
The creation of territorial regimes can often be traced to the critical junctures that 
define macro-processes of center formation, democratization, decolonization, or war. For 
example, India and Pakistan were born out of the partition that followed independence from 
the British. The United States, Switzerland and Germany came into being in the wake of 
revolutionary or unification wars. The European Union can be conceived as a form of center-
formation that was enabled by the experience of two World Wars (Bartolini 2005). In all 
these instances, extraordinary historical circumstances initiated a critical juncture that 
redefined the territorial order. But critical junctures can also yield authority migration in 
 existing federations, putting them on a new developmental trajectory. For example, the Civil 
War in the USA paved the way for the modernization of the American federal bureaucracy 
that shifted authority towards Washington (Bensel 1990; Skowronek 1982). Many territorial 
regimes witnessed a similar centralization of authority in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression that enabled the establishment of the welfare state (Obinger, Leibfried, and 
Castles 2005), while the most recent financial and economic crisis of 2007-09 also affected 
the distribution of authority in territorial regimes, albeit with a less obvious direction and 
intensity (Braun and Trein 2013). 
While exogenous shocks are important catalysts of transformation, so are endogenous 
sources which, we argue, are provoked by the ‘friction’ between the institutional layer of a 
territorial regime and the societal and ideational layers which underpin it. The institutional 
layer reflects the unique circumstances of its historical origins, and once it emerges, it is 
placed alongside existing social alignments and ideational paradigms. These layers 
continuously interact but do not necessarily evolve in unison or conformity with one another. 
As a result, ‘frictions’ may emerge, i.e. tensions between the principles and practices that 
structure each layer. These frictions form a source of endogenously induced dynamics 
(Lieberman 2002). 
Frictions between the institutional and societal layers are a product of the 
‘incongruence’ between territorial groups’ material and cultural endowments and their 
political control (Livingston 1956). Economic and cultural differences were the main 
dimensions that conditioned center-periphery relations during processes of state-formation 
and nation-building in Europe (Rokkan 1975) and in the post-colonial states of Latin America 
and Africa (Thies 2005), and they continue to define political contestation about European 
integration (Hooghe and Marks 2016). Today, differences in wealth between territories are at 
the basis of divergent voter preferences for levels of taxation and public good provisions 
 (Bolton and Roland 1997), of horizontal competition between state governments in their tax-
raising and welfare payment policies (Volden 2002) and of the political contention 
surrounding sub-national differentiation in levels of territorial autonomy (Piattoni 2010). 
Economic differences are more pronounced if they coincide with a cultural cleavage, 
incarnated in the presence of distinct stateless nations, like the Catalans or the Scots, since 
political actors in these regions can employ identity markers to mobilize economic grievances 
voters and to project their claims for distinct treatment. 
Frictions between the institutional and ideational layers will arise if there is 
‘incongruence’ between the federal ‘visions’ (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2001) espoused by 
constituent entities and the central government. While frictions are likely to exist in all 
territorial regimes,  more foundational divergent ‘visions’ are especially common in 
multinational societies, where national minorities and dominant cultural majorities embrace 
different conceptions of the moral foundations of the state. Each will espouse conflicting 
ideas about what constitutes a legitimate territorial order: what are the relevant social groups 
that deserve recognition, whether they have a right to self-determination, what are the proper 
territorial boundaries of constituent entities and what should be their relative authority. In 
Belgium, for example, a vision of federalism based on two linguistic communities is pursued 
by the Flemish parties, while the Francophone parties envisage a territorial order based on 
three regions. Similarly, the bi-national conception of Canada espoused by the Quebecois 
collides with the vision of Canada based on provinces defended by the English-speaking 
majority. Conflicting ideas over the location of sovereignty lie at the heart of disputes 
between Basque nationalists and their Spanish counterparts. The translation of ‘frictions’ into 
institutional change, however, requires a mechanism that activates the politicization of the 
issue by purposive political actors. 
 
  
Actors’ strategies and institutional linkages 
The logic of CHA is consistent with Craig Parson’s (2007) definition of an “institutional 
explanation.” As such, CHA seeks to explain what actors do within the historically 
constructed institutional – “man-made” – constraints within which they are working. The 
impetus for institutional change is provided by collective actors’ intentions and interests in 
the present, i.e. by the decisions of partisan and territorial actors, understood here as the 
executive and legislative branch of regional governments, to politicize the ‘friction’ between 
layers and to mobilize coalitions of support for territorial reform. 
Partisan actors will act according to their strategic interests and ideological beliefs 
(Toubeau and Massetti 2013; Toubeau and Wagner 2015). Their interests will depend on the 
scope of territory to which they are bound. Since the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the 
institutional layer bear distributional implications for territorial actors, they will articulate the 
interests of specific territorial entities and seek to improve the relative benefits of their 
membership in a territorial regime by securing greater authority and resources. In countries 
with ‘integrated’ party systems like the USA, in which all political parties compete at all 
levels of government and obtain state-wide representation, parties will aim to reconcile the 
competing territorial interests and to avoid challenging the stability of the federation 
(Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004). In contrast, in states with deep ethnic cleavages 
like Belgium or India, ethnic and regionalist parties may challenge that stability with the aim 
of obtaining greater self-rule and recognition of their cultural distinctiveness. To this demand, 
state-wide political parties will respond according to their strategic interests and to the 
openness of their ideology to decentralization (Sorens 2009), opening up a window for 
institutional change. 
 Initiatives for territorial reform will likely be met by considerable resistance from 
potential losers and ideological opponents. The pressure for continuity is thus provided by 
rival partisan and territorial actors present both in central and regional governments, whose 
interests and values are tied to the defence of the existing territorial order both in terms of 
institutional arrangement and ideational meaning. However, the influence of these opponents 
on the likelihood and substance of a territorial reform will be conditioned by the scope of 
their involvement in the decision-making process, a factor that is defined by the decision-
rules regulating territorial reform, embedded in the institutional layer since the moment of 
creation. 
These rules are, therefore, historically constructed. They structure the vertical and 
horizontal interactions between regional and central governments and shape a territorial 
regime’s propensity for enabling change or maintaining continuity. While regime dynamics 
are ultimately rooted in human behavior, the interaction among status quo defending and 
status quo challenging actors is always shaped unintentionally through institutions that reflect 
a deeper historical logic (Orren and Skowronek 2004). Drawing on the distinction raised 
earlier between intra- and inter-institutional linkages, we can broadly surmise that the latter 
will be more flexible and amenable to change. The Spanish State of Autonomies, for 
example, exhibits a weak formal representation of constituent entities at the center and a bi-
lateral system of inter-governmental relations based on partnership between regional and 
central governments. As a result, conflict lines surrounding territorial reforms have been 
highly territorial in nature: regional governments were the main initiators of reform of the 
regional Statutes of Autonomy (2004-2008) negotiating bilaterally with the central 
government the transfer of authority and resources, and, where relevant, the constitutional 
recognition of a distinct identity (Colino 2009). The reforms resulted in significant changes to 
seven statutes of autonomy but also reinforced the underlying centrifugal dynamic of the 
 territorial regime including a degree of asymmetry between Autonomous Communities 
(Keating and Wilson 2009). 
In contrast, we expect that intra-institutional linkages in territorial regimes are more 
likely to be rigid and to ensure continuity. For example, Germany is characterized by the 
representation of Länder executives in central decision-making through the territorial upper 
chamber, the Bundesrat and by a system of joint-decision making with compulsory 
negotiations. The wealthier Länder initiated reforms aimed at adjusting the allocation of 
authority over policies with a high degree of inter-dependence, such as the system of 
territorial financing, but they needed to negotiate with other Länder and the central 
government to reach an agreement. Negotiations produced a sequence of three reforms 
between 2004 and 2017 that gave way to some disentanglement of competences without, 
however, changing the basic structure of joint-decision making (discussed in Kropp and 
Behnke 2016 and in the article by Benz and Sonnicksen for this issue). 
Thus, the rules regulating territorial reform structure the involvement and power of 
partisan and territorial actors and exert an indirect influence on observed outcomes. 
Depending on the nature of institutional linkages that constitute the architecture of a 
territorial regime, we are likely to observe different patterns of territorial dynamics. 
 
Mechanisms of continuity and change 
CHA has identified a broad range of mechanisms that can be deployed to explain the 
dynamics of territorial regimes. The shift from the previous ‘snapshot view’ of how actors 
articulate ‘frictions’ during episodes of territorial reform to a ‘moving picture view’ of how 
they react to past decisions and set the territorial regime onto a new development trajectory, 
permits an evaluation of the time-dependent behavior of territorial regimes. (Table 1) 
 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Once a territorial arrangement is chosen at the moment of creation, it can be sustained 
over time by a number of ‘reproduction mechanisms’ (Pierson 2004) that generate 
institutional continuity. Territorial regimes create their own constituencies: governments, 
bureaucracies or party organizations all adapt their involvement in the new territorial regime. 
In doing so, they intentionally or unintentionally shape the institutionalization of main sites of 
political authority within which they engage in territorial politics. Positive feedback effects 
are, therefore, crucial in understanding the variety of institutionalized self-rule and shared-
rule relationships. If, for example, dual federations embark on a decentralizing trajectory 
based on self-rule, sub-federal political party organizations have an incentive to operate more 
independently from the federal organization. This initial move towards dissociation can set 
into motion a more general trend by which most party organizations follow the dual nature of 
the federation. For example, when the Canadian Conservatives lost power at the federal level 
in 1896, after having been in government since 1867 with only a brief interruption, provincial 
party wings became more independent. In doing so, they emulated the Liberals, who 
compensated their lack of competitiveness on the federal level with a flexible party 
organization that allowed them to dominate the provincial level (Stevenson 1993). This 
development, in turn, reinforced the dual nature of Canadian federalism in the long-term, and 
put Canada on a very different institutionalized pathway of territorial politics than, for 
example, Germany (Broschek 2012). 
The emerging institutional configuration of territorial regimes has redistributive 
consequences for a broad array of actors. Initial “winners” – collective actors representing 
center or periphery interests – have strong incentives to take advantage from their victory 
over institutional questions such as the form of the state, the allocation of competencies or the 
 degree of peripheral encapsulation in federal decision making. Paraphrasing Paul Pierson 
(2015, 135), they are likely to protect and amplify the initial power imbalance by “organizing 
some issues in and others out.” But to consolidate an imbalanced power structure, political 
elites need to generate loyalty. This process is supported by ideational mechanisms such as 
framing or belief formation (Béland 2009; Blyth 2002; Parsons 2016). If elites are able to 
establish a widely-shared belief system about what is morally appropriate early in a historical 
sequence, it is likely to promote institutional continuity thereby operating as a mechanism of 
reproduction. In Germany, for example, the strong sense of national unity shared by elites 
and masses during the nineteenth century produced the principle of Unitarismus (unitarism): 
the commitment of political and bureaucratic actors to establish harmonized rules within the 
federation (Lehmbruch 2002).5 
Even if early events set a territorial regime on a particular path, this does not entail 
that they should deterministically lead to a specific destination. Instead, it is possible that 
actors react against a status quo and change the path on which a territorial regime is 
travelling. This development unfolds through a series of ‘reactive sequences,’ defined as “a 
chain of temporally ordered and causally connected event” (Mahoney 2000) during which 
there is a backlash by political actors which transforms and perhaps reverses early events. 
Reactive sequences can be ignited as a result of “negative feedback” undermining the 
‘reproduction mechanisms’ that generate institutional continuity (Falleti and Mahoney 2015). 
For example, the functioning of territorial arrangements may produce certain unintended 
effects, such as duplication in competences, weak fiscal accountability or deadlock in 
decision-making at the center, which will undermine its value for the actors that have hitherto 
sustained it. Karlo Basta’s contribution to this special issue takes this even further by 
introducing a psychological mechanism to account for changing institutional dynamics. 
Building on case studies on Canada and Spain, he demonstrates how a self-reinforcing path 
 of institutional decentralization is turned into a reactive sequence when what he calls 
“substantive” (i.e. material) institutional reforms become paired with the recognition of 
national minority status for certain groups. The mechanism of “symbolic recognition” causes 
irritations in the collective self-understanding of majority and minority groups, which in turn 
triggers a new, more conflict-laden dynamic. 
The foregoing suggest that while territorial regimes are likely to become strongly 
entrenched over time, institutional change nevertheless occurs once regimes have embarked 
on a developmental trajectory. However, although undertaking institutional change is a 
possibility, the type and direction of change is inherently more difficult to predict (Mahoney 
2000). Following the taxonomy introduced by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), institutional 
change can take the form of ‘layering’ and ‘displacement’ or it can take the form of ‘drift’ 
and ‘conversion.’6 All of them have a lot to offer for examining territorial dynamics 
(Broschek 2011; Falleti 2010). While drift and conversion exemplify adaptation, layering and 
displacement are typically associated with deliberate efforts of institutional reform. In 
accordance with the research agenda introduced by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) or Falleti 
and Lynch (2009), scholars of territorial dynamics should examine, among other things, the 
conditions under which each mechanism occurs, such as the degree of rigidity of the larger 
political environment and the properties of the targeted institution itself (see for example 
Broschek 2011). Moreover, as is evident from Basta’s contribution, such mechanisms often 
work in tandem with ideational or psychological mechanisms. These interaction effects in 
territorial regimes need to be better understood 
 
Outline of the special issue 
The articles in this special issue adopt CHA to study how territorial regimes emerge and 
change over the long-run. They are all grounded in case-analysis, but the case studies vary in 
 their temporal range and geographical scope and in the aspects of territorial politics that they 
examine. The contributions are rooted in the analytical framework elaborated here by 
focusing on the sources and mechanisms of territorial dynamics. 
The first two articles focus on developments taking place within a critical juncture 
situated during the creation and development trajectories of territorial regimes.  In his 
comparative study of Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, Michael Breen investigates the 
creation of territorial regimes in deeply divided societies. He examines how historical 
contingencies interact with two conditions -- institutional capacities and risk of secession -- to 
generate three possible outcomes: a federation, quasi federalism or the status quo. His study 
suggests that ‘holding-together’ federalism is established when a moderate secession risk 
coincides with a substantive peripheral infrastructural capacity, paired by the lower 
infrastructural power at the center,. If the peripheral infrastructural capacity is low, however, 
federalism will be avoided and if the risk of secession is too high, federalism will be resisted. 
Karlo Basta’s article explains divergent territorial dynamics in Spain and Canada 
using a paired comparison of reform cases at different periods in time. Building upon the 
research on federalism as a tool to accommodate conflict in multinational states, he identifies 
an overlooked mechanism – institutional symbolism – and shows how the presence or 
absence of this mechanism has prompted different responses from state-wide parties. The 
study shows that once institutional changes are combined with symbolic recognition, at least 
parts of the majority community mobilizes against the recognition of minority nationhood in 
both cases, thereby opening the path to more radical demands from the minority and a 
destabilizing dynamic.  
Other articles are interested in how territorial regimes emerge and evolve over the 
long-term. The study by Simon Toubeau highlights convergent trends in Belgium, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. Toubeau shows that regional structures of authority were created in all 
 three countries in response to a rise in regional nationalism and that they all subsequently 
embarked a common decentralizing trajectory sustained by the ideological and organizational 
adaptation of mainstream parties to the new territorial structures and by their predominance 
in the system of inter-governmental relations. This trajectory changed course in the mid-2000 
when a resurgence of regional nationalism prompted a bottom-up process of territorial reform 
led by regional governments that was met by the reticence of mainstream parties at the center, 
and thus resulted in gradual institutional change. 
The article by Wilfried Swenden in contrast highlights divergent outcomes in the 
evolution of territorial regimes. Swenden’s study of strategies for managing divided societies 
in India and Pakistan explains the emergence of two contrasting pathways with the resilient 
effects of discrete choices made before independence and partition. Distinguishing between 
different sources of diversity – territorial, linguistic, caste-based and religious – Swenden 
shows how the Indian National Congress prompted a more accommodative strategy regarding 
language by aligning the territorial boundaries with language concentration, thereby reducing 
frictions between the ideological position of the Congress Party and the territorial 
organization of the state. In contrast, the ethnically imbalanced support for the Muslim 
League together with a stronger focus on securitization of the state yielded in a lock-in of 
integrationist strategies and greater central control in Pakistan.  
Finally, using the sequence of three reform processes federalism in Germany between 
2004 and 2017, the study by Arthur Benz and Jared Sonnicksen reminds us not to equate 
critical junctures with transformative change. They show that the combination of different 
external triggers (i.e. external actors, the crisis situation and the level of time pressure) 
affected the reform sequence so that change achieved in the first stage was later advanced 
backwards thereby reinforcing the existing historical legacy of joint-decision-making. The 
critical juncture opened a window for change, but the accumulated change negotiated in the 
 reform sequence amounted to a reinforcement of the existing pathway instead of the far 
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1 If at least two territorial layers enjoy genuine lawmaking authority, the state is composite, 
regardless of whether it is formally considered as unitary or federal. If lawmaking authority is 
monopolized by one tier, the case is an instance of a simple state. 
2 Elazar defines shared rule in vertical terms, as the possibilities for representatives of 
constituent units to participate in central decision-making. As horizontal coordination between 
constituent units can take the form of institutionalized joint decision-making, we also include 
the horizontal dimension of shared rule. 
3 There are variable instruments, such as a simple law, an organic or special law requiring a 
specific legislative majority, or reform of the constitution. 
4 Constitutional ambiguity is a result of early institutional alignments. Federations that feature 
a dual allocation of competencies are often fraught with greater degree of ambiguity than those 
which feature an integrated allocation where the primary responsibility of sub-federal entities 
is to implement federal legislation 
5 Unitarismus is different from centralization as representatives from the Länder and the federal 
level negotiate harmonization jointly, with no one actor being able to unilaterally impose the 
outcome on others. 
6 Layering occurs whenever constraints are high and territorial reform is difficult to achieve; it 
allows entrepreneurial actors to introduce a new dimensions to the institutional layer alongside 
the existing one, without replacing it. But over time, the accumulation of new layers leads to 
the eventual displacement of the former territorial regime 
                                                 
